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v. 
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 Pursuant to rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State 
submits this brief in reply to new matters raised in Defendant’s responsive 
brief.  The State does not concede any matters not addressed in the reply, 
but believes those matters are adequately addressed in the State’s opening 
brief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONESOULY HELD THAT 
DEFENDANT’S INCONSISTENT, POST-MIRANDA 
STATEMENTS WERE EQUIVALENT TO POST-MIRANDA 
SILENCE UNDER DOYLE AND CHARLES 
 When a defendant exercises his right not to talk to police, then 
testifies to an exculpatory version of events at trial, Doyle v. Ohio and 
Anderson v. Charles prohibit the State from arguing that the jury should not 
-2- 
believe the defendant’s testimony on the basis that he withheld that version 
from police when he refused to talk to them.  Doyle, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976); 
Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 407 (1980).  The Supreme Court reasoned that (1) it is 
“fundamentally unfair” to use a defendant’s post-Miranda silence when the 
warning implicitly assured him that “silence will carry no penalty,” and (2) 
silence is not necessarily inconsistent with later trial testimony because it 
“may be nothing more than . . . [an] exercise of these Miranda rights.”  
Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617. 
Here, Defendant did not remain silent after Miranda warnings.  The 
court of appeals nevertheless held that his post-Miranda statements were the 
equivalent of silence because it read them to be statements about the 
interrogation, not about the crime.  See State v. McCallie, 2016 UT App 4, ¶22, 
369 P.3d 103. 
In its opening brief, that State argued that Doyle and Charles only 
proscribe attempts to draw meaning from silence and do not create a class 
of silence-equivalent statements related to the interrogation.  The State 
argued alternatively that Defendant’s post-Miranda statements were not 
merely related to the interrogation.  They were instead a conflicting version 
of Defendant’s knowledge of and participation in the events that even the 
court of appeals’ reading of Doyle allowed the prosecutor to explore. 
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Defendant responds that the “court of appeals did not expand the 
meaning of Doyle.”  Br.Resp.16. Rather, he asserts that “Doyle made the 
distinction the court of appeals made here—that statements about the 
interrogation are the equivalent of silence.”  Br.Resp.9.  He further contends 
that Defendant’s “statements to the police almost exactly mirror those the 
Court treated as the equivalent of silence in Doyle” and thus were correctly 
treated as silence here.  Br.Resp.7. 
Defendant is mistaken on both fronts.  First, neither Doyle nor Charles 
created a category of silence-equivalent statements that the State cannot use 
at trial.  Second, even if Doyle and Charles created a category of silence-
equivalent statements, Defendant’s statements do not qualify here because 
his statements were about the facts of the crime, not about his interrogation. 
A. Doyle v. Ohio and Anderson v. Charles did not create a 
category of silence-equivalent statements that the State 
cannot use at trial. 
 Defendant argues that the court of appeals’ correctly read Doyle to 
have already understood that statements related only to the interrogation 
are the equivalent of silence.  According to him, this is because one of the 
two petitioners in Doyle v. Ohio was not actually silent, but made one or two 
post-Miranda statements and yet, the Court treated both petitioners as if 
-4- 
they had been silent. Br.Resp.10-11 (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 622 n.4 
(Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
But Doyle does not support Defendant’s or the court of appeals’ 
reading, nor support creating a category of statements that operate as 
silence. Foremost, Doyle neither considered nor held that a defendant’s 
statements are to be treated as silence when he speaks about his 
interrogation. Indeed, the majority in Doyle never directly acknowledged 
that petitioner Doyle made any post-Miranda statements.  The fact that 
Doyle had spoken was revealed only amid a lengthy footnote quoting the 
transcript of his cross-examination, where in response to the question of 
whether he had protested his innocence at arrest, Doyle answered that he 
had said only, “‘What’s this all about?’” 426 U.S. at 614 n.5.  And while the 
dissent briefly noted that “petitioner Doyle did not even remain silent,” it 
too examined the case in terms of silence.  Id. at 628 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
& n.4 (quoting at length Doyle’s cross-examination at co-petitioner’s trial, 
where Doyle testified that he also said “you got to be crazy” and possibly “I 
don’t know what you are talking about”).    
 Doyle framed the issue as “whether impeachment use of a defendant’s 
post-arrest silence violates any provision of the Constitution.” Id. at 616 
(emphasis added).  Likewise, the parties argued the case as one of silence.  
-5- 
See id. (stating that Ohio argued that “the discrepancy between an 
exculpatory story at trial and silence at time of arrest gives rise to an 
inference that the story was fabricated somewhere along the way”) 
(emphasis added).  Doyle thus says what it says and nothing more: “the use 
for impeachment purposes of petitioners’ silence, at the time of arrest and 
after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 619.  Doyle simply never held that a 
defendant’s statements operate as silence when his statements only concern 
his interrogation. 
Doyle’s reasoning likewise conflicts with an expansion of its rule to 
include a category of silence-equivalent statements.  Doyle reasoned it is 
fundamentally unfair to tell a Defendant that he has a constitutional right 
not to talk to police, and then penalize him when he exercises that right.  See 
Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618.  But when, as here, a defendant does talk to police, 
inquiring into the conversation does not punish him for exercising his right 
not to talk to police.  
Doyle also reasoned that silence cannot inform whether trial 
testimony is true because exercising the right not to tell the story sheds no 
light on whether it is true.  See id. at 617.  But statements can make such a 
showing when they conflict with trial testimony. 
-6- 
 Later courts, including Utah, took Doyle at its word.  “Doyle can have 
no application to a case in which the defendant did not exercise his right to 
remain silent.”  State v. Velarde, 675 P.2d 1194, 1196 (Utah 1984) (per curiam) 
(emphasis in original).  See also Lofton v. Wainwright, 620 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 
1980) (“We simply do not have a Doyle situation in the case before us 
[because] Lofton chose not to remain silent; he elected to talk”); United States 
v. Agee, 597 F.2d 350, 355 (3d Cir. 1979) (“Doyle can have no application to a 
case in which the defendant did [n]ot exercise his right to remain silent.”), 
cert. denied 442 U.S. 944 (1979); United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1073 
(5th Cir. 1978) (holding that 5th Amendment did not prohibit admission of 
Warren’s statement that he represented his companions and advised them 
to say nothing), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by United States v. 
Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Turner, 551 F.2d 780, 
782 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (holding that under Doyle, Turner’s 
statement to police that he “didn’t know anything” about forgery was not 
an exercise of his right to remain silent), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 942 (1977).  
 And in case Doyle left any doubt, the United States Supreme Court 
later made clear that Doyle only applies to silence on the subject matter of 
the crime. In Anderson v. Charles, it held that “Doyle does not apply to cross-
examination that merely inquires into prior inconsistent statements.”  447 
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U.S. at 408.  While “two inconsistent descriptions of events may be said to 
involve ‘silence’ insofar as it omits facts included in the other version . . . 
Doyle does not require any such formulistic understanding of ‘silence.’”  Id. 
at 409.  Charles thus rejected Defendant’s argument here:  there is no Doyle 
violation where a prosecutor uses a defendant’s “failure to tell the police the 
story he recounted at trial” where his “design[]” is not “to draw meaning 
from silence, but to elicit an explanation for a prior inconsistent statement.” 
Id. at 408-409.  
 The most that can be said about Doyle’s post-arrest statements is that 
the Supreme Court concluded that they were divorced from the subject 
matter of the crime about which the police were asking him.  Defendant 
nevertheless argues that Charles justifies the court of appeals’ creation of a 
category of silence-equivalent statements.  Br.Resp.11-12.  He points to 
Charles’s declaration that the petitioners in Doyle “‘made no postarrest 
statements about their involvement in the crime.’” Id. at 12 (quoting Charles, 447 
U.S. at 407) (emphasis provided by Defendant).  This, he asserts, 
demonstrates that Doyle purposely treated Doyle’s statements as the 
equivalent of silence because he did not speak to the facts of the crime.  Id.  
In other words, he says that under Doyle and Charles, the State could have 
-8- 
used his post-Miranda statements against him only if he used the words “I 
did not shoot the victim.”  See id.  
Charles holds the opposite.  Charles merely acknowledged—in another 
footnote—that while Doyle made one or two statements after arrest, the 
issue in Doyle “was said to involve cross-examination of a person who ‘does 
remain silent’ after police inform him that he is legally entitled to do so.”  
Charles, 447 U.S. at 407 n.2 (quoting Doyle, 426 U.S. at 620 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting)).  And Charles concluded that in “any event, neither [statement] 
contradicted the defendant’s later trial testimony.”  Id.  In other words, even 
though Doyle may have spoken to police, his statements to police—and the 
omissions therein—were not inconsistent.  Id.  Thus, “[a]s to the subject 
matter of his statements, the defendant has not remained silent at all.”  
Charles, 447 U.S. at 407.  See also United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975) 
(“A basic rule of evidence provides that prior inconsistent statements may 
be used to impeach the credibility of a witness,” but “the court must be 
persuaded that the statements are indeed inconsistent.”); Harris v. New York, 
401 U.S. 222, 225-226 (1971) (explaining any witness may be impeached with 
prior statement that is inconsistent with trial testimony).  
 Here, just like in Charles, “[a]s to the subject matter of his statements, 
the defendant has not remained silent at all.”  Charles, 447 U.S. at 407.  And 
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also like in Charles, the statements Defendant made on this subject matter 
were patently inconsistent with the testimony he gave at trial.   
 After hearing his Miranda rights, Defendant claimed that the police 
had awakened him and professed to be unaware that the shooting had 
happened.  He demanded to know why the police were questioning him, 
telling them, “You people woke me up.”  R.298:65.  When informed that he 
had been arrested for attempted murder, he asked, “To who?” and “Whose  
got a gunshot wound?”  R.298:65, 70.  And again, he told police, “You woke 
me up.  I want to know what’s going on.”  R.298:65.   
 Yet at trial, Defendant admitted that he had been awake and knew 
about the shooting, but claimed that he fired the gun accidentally after 
Defendant pulled his gun in self-defense.  R.298:44-46.  Under Charles, this is 
exactly the kind of “inconsistent descriptions of events” that a prosecutor is 
free to use to impeach trial testimony and to highlight in closing arguments. 
447 U.S. at 409.    
 In reality, the court of appeals and Defendant employ the same 
“formulistic understanding of ‘silence’” Charles eschewed.  Id. at 409.  
Defendant argues that because the prosecutor told the jury in closing 
rebuttal that Defendant “‘didn’t say it was an accident.  He doesn’t say this 
was self-defense,’” he improperly asked the jury to “consider his failure to 
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speak—to tell his side—as evidence of guilt.”  Br.Resp. 15, 22 (quoting 
R.298:120) (emphasis provided by Defendant).  But Charles rejected the 
notion that for Doyle purposes, “silence” includes facts omitted in the 
defendant’s contradictory story.  447 U.S. at 409.  And it condoned the 
prosecutor’s argument that Charles “fail[ed] to tell the police the story he 
recounted at trial” because the prosecutor’s “design[]” was not “to draw 
meaning from silence, but to elicit an explanation for a prior inconsistent 
statement.” Id. at 409.  That is all the prosecutor did here.  
 In closing rebuttal, the prosecutor paraphrased some of Defendant’s 
statements and then contrasted those statements with what Defendant 
testified to at trial: 
The evolution of his story from the very beginning when they 
questioned him, what does he say?  Why am I here?  Why are 
you jerking me off?  Nothing happened.  You woke me up.  
You woke me up.  He didn’t say it was an accident.  He doesn’t 
say this was self-defense [like he testified at trial]. 
R.298:120.  Thus, like in Charles, the prosecutor’s design was not “to draw 
meaning from silence,” but to lay bare the inconsistencies in his stories. 447 
U.S. at 408-409.  His argument did not violate Doyle.   
 Defendant also contends that the court of appeals correctly 
determined that the prosecutor committed a Doyle violation here because 
his statements “were nothing different than those in Doyle.” Br.Resp.17. But 
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they were different.  At most, Doyle said, “What’s this all about?”, “you got 
to be crazy,” and perhaps, “I don’t know what you are talking about.”  426 
U.S. at 614 n.5, 628 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  In contrast, Defendant told 
the police, “You people woke me up,” asked “To who?” and “Whose got a 
gunshot wound?” when informed that he had been arrested for attempted 
murder, and again told police, “You woke me up.  I want to know what’s 
going on.”  R.298:65, 70. These queries and statements were not, like in 
Doyle, consistent with his later trial testimony.  See Charles, 447 U.S. at 407 
n.2. Rather, Defendant’s statements to police—that he had been asleep, was 
unaware of any shooting, and was not involved—told a very different story 
than what he testified to at trial—that he was awake and fired the gun 
accidentally.  See Sallahdin v. Gibson, 275 F.3d 1211, 1230 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that prosecutor’s cross-examination was “within permissible limits 
because [Sallahdin] presented a new story at trial that was materially 
different from the information he provided to the police”).   
 Both the court of appeals and Defendant do not acknowledge that 
Defendant asked “To who?” and “Whose got a gunshot wound?” when he 
was informed that he had been arrested for attempted murder. See McCallie, 
2016 UT App 4, ¶6; Br.Resp.17. Instead, Defendant and the court of appeals 
omitted these queries from their analyses. Id.  This may be because the court 
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of appeals examined the prosecutor’s closing rebuttal argument where he 
paraphrased some of Defendant’s statements and did not include these two 
questions.  See R.298:120. 
But this does not mean that these queries should be ignored when 
considering whether Defendant’s legally exculpatory trial story was 
inconsistent with the factually exculpatory story he told police.  The 
prosecutor asked Defendant about these queries and he then summarized 
Defendant’s inconsistent story during his rebuttal argument.  See R.298:65, 
70, 120.   
 But even without considering these two questions, Defendant’s 
statement(s) alone that the police had awoken him—and thus he was asleep 
during the shooting and could not have been involved—was inconsistent 
with his trial testimony that he was awake and that he fired the gun  
accidentally after Defendant pulled his gun in self-defense.  See R.298:44-46.  
Defendant’s statements were thus not like Doyle’s at all; they were 
statements that were directly contradictory to his testimony at trial.  
Consequently, neither Doyle nor Charles supports the court of appeals’ 
creation of silent-equivalent statements here.   
 The cases Defendant cites in his responsive brief likewise do not 
support the court of appeals’ decision.  Indeed, in the forty-five years since 
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Doyle, the State is aware of no other case—and the court of appeals cited 
none—that also treated a defendant’s statements as the equivalent of 
silence.  
 Defendant relies primarily on selective silence cases.  See Br.Resp.12-
13, 19-21 (citing Hurd v. Terhune, 619 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2010); United States 
v. Caruto, 532 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008); Kibbe v. Dubois, 269 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 
2001); United States v. Canterbury, 985 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1993); United States 
v. Scott, 47 F.3d 904 (7th Cir. 1995), and United States v. May, 52 F.3d 885 
(10th Cir. 1995)).  None speaks to the statements Defendant made.   
 Unlike in this case, a defendant is selectively silent if he chooses not to 
answer a particular question, but answers others throughout a voluntary 
police interview.  See Evelyn French, Note, When Silence Ought to Be Golden:  
Why the Supreme Court Should Uphold the Selective Silence Doctrine in the Wake 
of Salinas v. Texas, 48 Ga. L. Rev. 623, 625 (Winter 2014).  See also, e.g., Hurd, 
619 F.3d at 1084 (Hurd answered police questions but refused to reenact 
shooting several times and prosecution argued this refusal was affirmative 
evidence of guilt); Caruto, 532 F.3d at 824, 829 (Caruto answered some 
questions, but after five minutes invoked right to counsel; prosecution 
argued Caruto’s silence to police’s unanswered questions demonstrated 
guilt); Kibbe, 269 F.3d at 30 (Kibbe answered postarrest, post-Miranda 
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questions about why he was at scene of the crime, but not about why he fled 
when police arrived); Canterbury, 985 F.2d 483 (Canterbury made three 
statements to police—he bought a silencer, he bought it for protection, and 
he did not have any other silencers; his defense at trial was entrapment and 
prosecution argued his failure to tell arresting officers that he was set up 
showed guilt); May, 52 F.3d at 889 (May gave “various versions of his ‘story’ 
when speaking to authorities,” but not his trial version). 
 The issue in a selective silence case is whether the prosecutor may use 
the defendant’s silence in not answering particular questions. But none of 
these cases illuminate whether Doyle barred using Defendant’s statements 
here.  In fact, the United States Supreme Court has not answered this 
question and the circuit courts are split on the answer.  See French, When 
Silence Ought to Be Golden, at 639-640.  Currently, the First, Fifth, and Eighth 
Circuits allow admission of a defendant’s silence in selective silence cases 
while the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits do not.  In circuits that permit 
admission of a defendant’s silence, they reason that Doyle does not apply 
where a defendant waived his right to remain silent by talking voluntarily 
with the police.  His entire conversation—including omissions—is thus 
admissible until the defendant re-invokes his right to remain silent.  See 
United States v. Burns, 276 F.3d 439, 442 (8th Cir. 2002) (“[W]here the accused 
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initially waives his or her right to remain silent and agrees to questioning, 
but subsequently refuses to answer further questions, the prosecution may 
note the refusal because it now constitutes part of an otherwise admissible 
conversation between the police and the accused.”); United States v. Pando 
Franco, 503 F.3d 389, 397 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that Pando Franco “waived 
his right to have the entire conversation, including the implicit references to 
his silence contained therein, used against him as substantive evidence of 
guilt”). 
 And in circuits that prohibit use of silence in this way, they reason 
that Miranda “applies to every question investigators pose” and a 
defendant’s refusal to answer any one question is therefore inadmissible.  
Hurd, 619 F.3d at 1087.  See also Scott, 47 F.3d at 907 (explaining that suspects 
may “refuse to answer certain questions, and still be confident that Doyle 
will prevent the prosecution from using his silence against him”); May, 52 
F.3d at 890 (explaining that “partial silence does not preclude him from 
claiming a violation of his due process rights under Doyle”).   
 But even in circuits that disallow evidence of a defendant’s silence in 
response to a particular question, the inquiry is still whether the prosecutor 
aimed to draw meaning from the defendant’s silence:  “As stated in Charles, 
the primary inquiry in cases where a defendant waives his or her Miranda 
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rights is whether the prosecutor’s question or argument is ‘designed to 
draw meaning from silence’ or instead merely ‘to elicit an explanation for a 
prior inconsistent statement.’”  Caruto, 532 F.3d at 830 (quoting Charles, 447 
U.S. at 409) (emphasis added).  See also Canterbury, 985 F.2d at 486 (“[T]his 
case turns on whether the cross-examination was designed to impeach the 
defendant’s trial testimony by calling attention to prior inconsistent 
statements or, instead, was designed to suggest an inference of guilt from 
the defendant’s post-arrest silence.”); May, 52 F.3d at 890 (explaining “test” 
is “‘whether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such 
character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a 
comment’ on the defendant’s right to remain silent”).   
 Where the prosecutor’s questions or argument was not designed to 
draw meaning from the defendant’s silence, there is no Doyle violation even 
in these jurisdictions.  See Scott, 47 F.3d at 906 (finding no Doyle violation 
because prosecutor was pointing out inconsistencies in Scott’s story where 
prosecutor asked whether he “never mentioned to Special Agent Hinkle this 
story you're telling us today, did you?”); Canterbury, 985 F.2d at 486 
(holding that Canterbury’s post arrest statements were not inconsistent with 
his defense at trial and prosecutor’s argument was designed to show his 
failure to present his exculpatory story at arrest); May, 52 F.3d at 886-887, 
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890 (finding no Doyle violation where May raised defense of withdrawal 
from conspiracy for first time at trial, but gave a different story at arrest 
because prosecutor’s design was to call attention to prior inconsistent 
statements). 
 Selective silence cases do not answer the question here.  Defendant 
was not silent and the prosecution did not admit evidence that Defendant 
remained silent in response to a particular question.  Instead, Defendant 
made certain exculpatory statements and the prosecutor contrasted these 
with his trial testimony.  Thus, as shown above, Charles controls.  But 
nonetheless, all the selective silence cases cited in Defendant’s brief support 
the State’s position.  This is because even where a defendant’s silence is 
admitted, there is no Doyle violation if the prosecutor’s aim was merely to 
call attention to prior inconsistent statements. See id. Here, where 
Defendant’s statements—not his silence—were contrasted, there surely was 
no Doyle violation.  See United States v. Gomez, 725 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 
2013) (“Because the impeachment evidence here concerned Defendant’s 
statement, however, Doyle’s rule does not apply.”) (emphasis in original).  
See also Kibbe, 269 F.3d at 37 (explaining that “when a defendant makes a 
post-Miranda statement on a particular subject, and then makes a second 
statement on the same subject at trial, the prosecutor can refer to post-arrest 
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silence to expose any inconsistencies between the two statements”); State v. 
Sorrels, 642 P.2d 373, 375 (Utah 1982) (explaining that to constitute Doyle 
violation, the State must use the silence in a way that “raises the inference 
that silence equals guilt.”); State v. Singleton, 693 P.2d 68, 69-70 (Utah 1984) 
(finding no Doyle violation where prosecutor asked officer several questions 
about Singleton not having anything to say because “the testimony was 
elicited solely to provide foundation for the relevant and admissible” 
statement and did “not suggest that it was conducted in any effort to 
encourage any inference of guilt from appellant’s silence”); State v. Bakalov, 
979 P.2d 799, 820 (Utah 1999) (explaining “Doyle prohibits the prosecutor’s 
use of defendant’s silence to demonstrate guilt”) (emphasis in original). 
 The remaining cases upon which Defendant relies are similarly 
unavailing.  For example, citing State v. Wiswell, Defendant claims that this 
“is exactly what occurred here.”  Br.Resp.23 (citing State v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 
146 (Utah 1981)).  But Wiswell found a Doyle violation where Wiswell said 
nothing at all to officers and yet the prosecutor argued to the jury that 
Wiswell was guilty because he “didn’t tell the officer that he was an 
unwilling participant.”  Wisell, 639 P.2d at 147.  Likewise, the Virgin Islands 
found a Doyle violation where the defendant made no statements at all to 
the police, but the prosecutor argued that the defendant was guilty for not 
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coming forward and telling the police that “someone else had shot the 
victim.” when.  Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Davis, 561 F.3d 159, 162 (3rd Cir. 
2009).  And in United States v. Christian, unlike here, the court determined 
that the defendant’s refusal to make a written statement “should not have 
been alluded to at trial.”  22 M.J. 519, 521-522 (N.-M. C.M.R. 1986). 
Again, that is not what happened here.  The State merely argued that 
Defendant’s trial testimony that he was awake, at the crime scene, and fired 
the gun accidentally conflicted with his statements to police that he was 
asleep and demanding to know who had been shot. 
 In sum, none of the cases Defendant cites support the court of 
appeals’ treatment of his statements as silence here.  Rather, controlling 
authority compels the conclusion that the court of appeals incorrectly 
applied Doyle and Charles.   
 Finally, Defendant’s own hypothetical examples further demonstrate 
that the court of appeals’ decision expands Doyle far beyond its reasoning, 
denying the State access to impeachment evidence that no constitutional 
rule prohibits using and skewing the truth-finding function of the courts in 
the process.  Defendant asserts that a defendant’s statements about his 
interrogation that would rebut an insanity defense or to show intoxication 
“are not problematic” and are still admissible under McCallie because they 
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“do not use a person’s silence to impeach their testimony.”  Br.Resp.14 n.3.  
But McCallie is not so limited.  Unlike Charles, it does not consider whether 
the prosecutor’s design was to use a defendant’s silence.  Instead, rather 
than accounting for context, McCallie requires all statements about an 
interrogation to be treated as silence:  “under [Charles], post-arrest 
statements about the suspect’s involvement in the interrogation itself . . . 
are, for Doyle purposes, the equivalent of silence [and] the prosecutor may 
not use such statements to impeach a defendant’s trial testimony.”  McCallie, 
2016 UT App 4, ¶21.  Contrary to what Defendant says now,  McCallie 
would prohibit the prosecutor from impeaching a defendant with 
statements that are not about his involvement in the crime, but reflect on his 
level of intoxication or mental health.   Id.   
 Likewise, Defendant is mistaken when he declares that a prosecutor 
“could clearly ask” a defendant “why he lied about his name and residence” 
to arresting officers.  Br.Resp.22.  McCallie compels the opposite conclusion.  
Because the lies are not about the facts of the crime, the State would be 
prohibited from asking the defendant about his misrepresentations.  Id.    
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B. Even if Doyle and Charles created a category of silence-
equivalent statements, Defendant’s statements do not qualify 
here because they were about the facts of the crime. 
 Defendant also argues that the court of appeals correctly held that the 
prosecutor committed a Doyle violation because Defendant’s statements 
were not about his involvement in the shooting, but were about his 
interrogation.  Br.Resp.25-27.  He asserts that his statements “were no more 
[than] general questions asking what was going on and why he was there.”  
Br.Resp. 26. 
This reasoning promotes labeling over substance.  The reasoning goes 
like this: because Defendant told police that they had awakened him, asked 
to know why, and asked who had been shot, they could be characterized as 
questions about the interrogation and off limits. 
But as explained, Defendant’s statements were much more than 
questions about his interrogation and provided an exculpatory story that 
conflicted with the story he later gave at trial.  Thus, even if the court of 
appeals’ distinction between statements about a defendant’s interrogation—
which the court concluded receive Doyle protection—and statements about 
a defendant’s involvement in the crime—which the court acknowledged 
would not receive Doyle protection—were supportable, the court of appeals 
still erred here.  This Court should reverse. 
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CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the State’s opening 
brief, the Court should reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
 Respectfully submitted on March 16, 2017. 
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